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As the Supreme Court continues to struggle to produce a coherent
doctrine of personal jurisdiction, a growing number of commentators
argue that personal jurisdiction lacks a constitutional foundation. On this
view, the decision to elevate personal jurisdiction to a constitutional
requirement following the Civil War was a mistake only partially
remedied when the Court loosened the reins by adopting a more flexible
requirement in the line of cases following World War II.
What advocates of curtailing or eliminating the personal jurisdiction
requirement overlook is both the historic pedigree of personal
jurisdiction and its ongoing vitality as a substantive due process right.
The concept of jurisdiction as a tool for policing the boundaries between
sovereign states predated the Constitution and was embraced from
ratification through the Civil War. The novel idea developed by the
Supreme Court at that time was the transformation of personal
jurisdiction into an individual right to be free from ill founded assertions
of government authority. This transformation foreshadowed the similar
transformations that the Bill of Rights would undergo in the process of
incorporation.
This Article argues that treating personal jurisdiction as an
incorporated right both explains its constitutional status and suggests a
new framework for the debate regarding the scope of the right.
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INTRODUCTION
The doctrine of personal jurisdiction is surprisingly unsettled,
especially considering that thousands of first-year law students are
expected to master the subject every year. That is not to say that the
doctrine is completely up in the air: the U.S. Supreme Court has
developed a set of rules that resolve many cases in satisfactory fashion
and has even identified the source of the personal jurisdiction
requirement in the Due Process Clause. What is missing is an
explanation of how the two are tied together. The Supreme Court has not
supplied much more than an ipse dixit to explain how the Due Process
Clause leads to the current state of personal jurisdiction, and most
commentators seem more inclined to tear down existing doctrine than to
explain its foundations.' This Article aims to fill that gap.
1. See generally Jay Conison, What Does Due Process Have To Do With
Jurisdiction?, 46 RUTGERS L. REv. 1071 (1994); Wendy Collins Perdue, Personal
Jurisdiction and the Beetle in the Box, 32 B.C. L. REv. 529 (1991); Ralph U. Whitten,
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Besides the sense of intellectual satisfaction felt when the United
States Constitution is interpreted in a manner that makes sense, there are
two direct benefits that derive from a coherent theory of the personal
jurisdiction requirement. First, it allows for a rational approach to
difficult cases. The complex framework that the Court has built is
ultimately grounded in "fair play and substantial justice."2 This vague
notion is sufficient to dispose of cases that fit within the framework,
where the justices share an underlying consensus as to the correct result.
When dealing with difficult cases that split the Court, however, the
existing framework provides little guidance. This Article aims to
provide a more solid foundation for decision making by grounding the
personal jurisdiction inquiry on an individual right, incorporated through
the Due Process Clause but with roots stretching back to the earliest days
of American history. Second, a coherent theory of personal jurisdiction
allows for the development of a single test, enabling the Court to do
away with the artificial constructs of "general" and "specific" personal
jurisdiction.3
Where this Article departs from the crowd is in locating the
personal jurisdiction doctrine in the context of other rights protected by
the Fourteenth Amendment, particularly those set forth in the Bill of
Rights. By the mid-nineteenth century, state courts-and ultimately the
Supreme Court-had established the requirement of personal jurisdiction
quite firmly in the context of the Full Faith and Credit Clause. In fact,
personal jurisdiction was sufficiently fundamental to the federalist
structure of the United States to merit incorporation under the Due
Process Clause.
The Constitutional Limitations on State-Court Jurisdiction: A Historical-Interpretative
Reexamination of the Full Faith and Credit and Due Process Clauses (Part One), 14
CREIGHTON L. REv. 499 (1981) [hereinafter Whitten, Full Faith and Credit]; Ralph U.
Whitten, The Constitutional Limitations on State-Court Jurisdiction: A Historical-
Interpretative Reexamination of the Full Faith and Credit and Due Process Clauses (Part
Two), 14 CREIGHTON L. REv. 735 (1981) [hereinafter Whitten, Due Process]; Martin H.
Redish, Due Process, Federalism, and Personal Jurisdiction: A Theoretical Evaluation,
75 Nw. U. L. REv. 1112 (1981); John N. Drobak, The Federalism Theme in Personal
Jurisdiction, 68 IOWA L. REv. 1015 (1983); Harold S. Lewis, Jr., The Three Deaths of
"State Sovereignty" and the Curse of Abstraction in the Jurisprudence of Personal
Jurisdiction, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 699 (1983); Patrick J. Borchers, The Death of the
Constitutional Law of Personal Jurisdiction: From Pennoyer to Burnham and Back
Again, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 19 (1990); James Weinstein, The Federal Common Law
Origins of Judicial Jurisdiction: Implications for Modern Doctrine, 90 VA. L. REv. 169
(2004); Allan Erbsen, Impersonal Jurisdiction, 60 EMORY L.J. 1 (2010).
2. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
3. The distinction between general and specific jurisdiction relies on a sharp line
between related and unrelated contacts that is difficult to justify. See Lea Brilmayer,
How Contacts Count: Due Process Limitations on State Court Jurisdiction, 1980 SuP.
CT. REv. 77, 80-88 (1980).
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Drawing on the work of Professor Akhil Amar,4 this Article shows
that the modem rule of personal jurisdiction is best understood as
resulting from the refined incorporation of the pre-existing rule of
personal jurisdiction. Unfortunately, the Pennoyer v. Neff Court did not
complete the incorporation process by evaluating how personal
jurisdiction should change as a result of passing through the prism of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Instead, through Pennoyer the Court embedded
a relatively rigid jurisdictional requirement as a constitutional rule.
When the Supreme Court revisited the need for a more flexible rule of
jurisdiction in 1945, it lost sight of the right's history and began applying
its own sense of fair play and substantial justice, rather than building on
the cases that had come before.
A renewed focus on the origins of personal jurisdiction, together
with the changes that result from shedding the "state-right husk before
[the] citizen-right core can be absorbed by the Fourteenth Amendment,"
6
will both clarify personal jurisdiction doctrine and put it on firmer
constitutional footing. This Article will show that a proper focus on the
individual right source of the personal jurisdiction requirement strongly
suggests that the Supreme Court's repeated plurality insistence on
purposeful availment in the form of deliberate acts targeting the forum
state is well-founded. This Article will also suggest how specific and
general jurisdiction might be melded into a single inquiry.
This Article will begin by examining the history of the personal
jurisdiction requirement, which in turn will require an examination of the
history of the Full Faith and Credit Clause. The Article will then discuss
how Pennoyer v. Neff transformed the doctrine of personal jurisdiction
and how that transformation was left incomplete. Next, the Article will
consider how courts might draw from the experience of the incorporation
of the Bill of Rights to determine how best to approach personal
jurisdiction. The Article will then compare this approach to how the
Supreme Court has actually addressed personal jurisdiction in the
modem era. Finally, the Article will address some current issues in
personal jurisdiction and how treating personal jurisdiction as an
individual right should affect their resolution.
4. Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 YALE
L.J. 1193 (1992).
5. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
6. Amar, supra note 4, at 1197.
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I. THE FOUNDATIONS OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION
A. Personal Jurisdiction and the Full Faith and Credit Clause
State courts dealt with matters of personal jurisdiction before the
ratification of the Constitution7 and indeed, before the Revolutionary
War.' Courts decided the earliest cases based on principles of
international law or on particular compacts between states.9 The creation
of the Full Faith and Credit Clause in the Articles of Confederation0
and, later, in the Constitution, changed the legal landscape. However,
despite the new constitutional command, states remained relatively
consistent on one point: a judgment rendered without jurisdiction was a
nullity.
The Full Faith and Credit Clause" and the associated implementing
statute12 require that each state give "full faith and credit" to, among
other things, the judicial proceedings of every other state. Both the
Clause and the Act were vague as to the meaning of "full faith and
credit." Shortly after their enactment, a debate ensued over whether
foreign state judgments were entitled to conclusive effect or were merely
to be treated as prima facie evidence.13 The Supreme Court resolved the
debate in favor of the former position in Mills v. Duryee. 14
While this initial debate was being resolved, another question
emerged: what was to be done if a party alleged that the state rendering
judgment lacked jurisdiction over the case? The Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court laid down an early marker in Bissel v. Briggs,' 5 a case
decided in the same year as Mills v. Duryee:
But neither our own statute, nor the federal [C]onstitution, nor the
[A]ct of Congress, had any intention of enlarging, restraining, or in
any manner operating upon, the jurisdiction of the legislatures, or of
the courts of any of the United States .... Whenever, therefore, a
record of a judgment of any court of any state is produced as
conclusive evidence, the jurisdiction of the court rendering it is open
7. Whitten, Full Faith and Credit, supra note 1, at 535.
8. Id. at 527.
9. See id.
10. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IV, para. 3.
11. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 ("Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to
the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the
Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records, and
Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.").
12. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1948).
13. Whitten, Full Faith and Credit, supra note 1, at 559-63.
14. Mills v. Duryee, 11 U.S. 481 (1813).
15. Bissell v. Briggs, 9 Mass. 462,467 (1813).
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to inquiry; and if it should appear that the court had no jurisdiction of
the cause, no faith or credit whatever will be given to the judgment. 16
The choice of language here is telling: the court did not identify
jurisdictional rules as constitutionally derived, but rather as remaining
unchanged from the pre-Constitutional regime. The analysis seems to
begin from the starting point of the states as independent sovereigns.
With the advent of the Constitution, the states are no longer completely
sovereign: among other changes, the Compact Clause prevents states
from coming to arrangements between each other regarding the treatment
of each other's judgments, and the Full Faith and Credit Clause allows
Congress to decide how each state must treat foreign judgments.
However, in the court's view, in areas where neither the Constitution nor
Congress has explicitly abrogated state sovereignty, the starting point for
analysis is the assumption that the states are separate sovereigns.
Accordingly, the court understood the relationship between states to
be equivalent to the relationship between foreign nations, at least as to
the issue of jurisdiction. Thus, the court felt free to draw on the
principles of international law-widely regarded at the time as a
transcendental body of law based on universal principles of justice 17-in
deciding matters of jurisdiction.
The Bissel opinion proved influential.18 State courts asked to rule
on the validity of foreign state judgments explained that "no effect or
validity would be given to [such a judgment], if it appeared that the court
rendering it had not jurisdiction of the person as well as the subject
matter;"'9 that "upon a matter without [its jurisdiction], the decree of
judgment is a nullity every where;"'20 and that "if the tribunal had no
jurisdiction, the judgment would be a nullity every where.",2 1 Similar
sentiments were expressed in most cases that addressed the subject.
22
The Supreme Court embraced the reasoning of Bissel in D'Arcy v.
Ketchum,23 both in terms of the content of the jurisdictional rule and the
reasoning behind it. In D'Arcy, the Court was confronted with a New
York statute that allowed New York courts to exercise jurisdiction over
individuals who neither lived in New York nor had been given any notice
of the case.24 The Court confirmed the Bissel court's use of international
16. Id. at 467.
17. See Conison, supra note 1, at 1103.
18. Id. at 1114.
19. Starbuck v. Murray, 5 Wend. 148, 156 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1830).
20. Picket v. Johns, 1 Dev. Eq. 123, 131 (N.C. 1827).
21. Wernwag v. Pawling, 5 G. & J. 500, 507 (Md. 1833).
22. See, e.g., Wilcox v. Kassick, 2 Mich. 165, 171 (1851).
23. D'Arcy v. Ketchum, 52 U.S. 165 (1850).
24. Id. at 173. The Court quoted a New York statute:
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law as the appropriate starting point for the analysis.25 The Court went
on to explain that the international law among the states in 1790 required
that "a judgment rendered in one [s]tate, assuming to bind the person of a
citizen of another, was void within the foreign [s]tate, when the
defendant had not been served with process or voluntarily made
defence.26 Because neither the Full Faith and Credit Clause nor the Act
of Congress had overturned that pre-existing law,27 such judgments
should be treated as void.28
As a product of international law, the personal jurisdiction doctrine
naturally focused on mediating interactions between sovereigns. If a
state wished to exercise jurisdiction more broadly than was generally
recognized, it was free to have its own courts do so.29 The restriction of
the personal jurisdiction doctrine protected other states from being
required to recognize such grandiose claims of jurisdiction, but it did not
act to prevent the forum state's courts from recognizing any particular
intra-state exercise of jurisdiction.3 °
Some commentators have suggested that to the extent that
protecting individuals was a concern, courts primarily focused on
ensuring that individuals received notice of the suit. While notice was
important, I believe it goes too far to claim that notice was the only
concern. Failure to notify the defendant of a pending case was of course
a common reason that the forum state might lack jurisdiction, and courts
naturally took a dim view of such things.31 However, when called upon
to make a distinction, courts recognized that jurisdiction required more
than mere notice and that, for example, a resident of New York who
never left New York could not be served with process sufficient to bring
him within the jurisdiction of Massachusetts.32
[W]here joint debtors are sued and one is brought into.court on process, he
shall answer the plaintiff; and if judgment shall pass for plaintiff, he shall have
judgment and execution, not only against the party brought into court, but also
against other joint debtors named in the original process, in the same manner as
if they had all been taken and brought into court by virtue of such process ....
Id.




29. Conison, supra note 1, at 1103.
30. Id.
31. See, e.g., Chew v. Randolph, 1 Miss. 1, 4 (1818) ("It is certainly contrary to our
ideas of justice in legal proceedings, as well as in the common transactions of life, to
determine and adjudicate upon a question, in which a man's life, liberty, or property is
involved, without affording him an opportunity of being heard in his defence.").
32. Kilburn v. Woodworth, 5 Johns. 37, 41 (N.Y. 1809) ("The defendant was not a
resident of Massachusetts, when the suit was commenced; his domicil was in this state,
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Notice to the defendant was generally necessary for personal
jurisdiction but was not sufficient. Service of process within the forum
state universally constituted sufficient notice; traveling to New York to
inform somebody that he or she was being sued in Massachusetts did not
alone establish jurisdiction in Massachusetts unless the defendant
voluntarily appeared in person or through counsel.
The general content of the personal jurisdiction doctrine was
derived from the sovereign relationship between states and operated to
prevent one state from being forced to follow the dictates of another state
in a case in which the foreign state lacked jurisdiction.33 However, as
courts applied the doctrine in individual cases, it also necessarily
operated to protect individual defendants from being haled into foreign
states to defend themselves.
B. Pennoyer v. Neff- A Subtle Revolution
The Civil War and the Reconstruction Amendments that followed
irrevocably altered the relationship between individual citizens, states,
and the federal government. Pennoyer v. NefJ34 presented a vehicle for
the Supreme Court to address how those changes affected the law of
personal jurisdiction. Over the course of its opinion, the Supreme Court
wrought a change in the treatment of personal jurisdiction that has been
highly criticized but not fully understood.
The facts of the case are familiar and need not be belabored:
Mitchell, a resident of Oregon, brought suit against Neff, a resident of
California.35 Neff was not personally served with process in the state
and did not appear in the case.36 Neff's failure to answer the complaint
following constructive service of process by publication resulted in a
default judgment being entered against him.37 Pennoyer acquired the
land in the subsequent sheriffs sale.38 Thus, when Neff later brought
suit over the ownership of the property, the result turned on the validity
of the judgment in the original suit between Mitchell and Neff.
39
The Supreme Court proceeded to analyze the question presented in
three steps. First, it announced what it considered to be the universal
and being in person here, and not within the jurisdiction of the court of Massachusetts, he
was not, and could not have been served with process.").
33. Conison, supra note 1, at 1103.
34. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
35. Id. at 719.
36. Id. at 719-20.
37. Id. at 720.
38. Id. at 719.
39. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 719.
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principles of personal jurisdiction.4 ° Second, it surveyed the preceding
cases, decided pursuant to the Full Faith and Credit Clause, to confirm
that the development of the personal jurisdiction doctrine conformed to
the principles it described.41 Finally, the Court considered the change in
the legal landscape caused by the Fourteenth Amendment.42
The Court grounded its universal principles of jurisdiction very
firmly in the concept of state sovereignty.43 States, the Court held,
"possess and exercise the authority of independent [s]tates" except as
limited by the Constitution.44 One feature of this authority is that "every
[s]tate possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and
property within its territory. 45 As a corollary to this authority, no other
state may exercise authority over persons and property within another
state. The Court expanded the principle to cover the entire federal
system, holding that no state may "exercise direct jurisdiction and
authority over persons or property without its territory. 46 Accordingly,
Oregon could not exercise power over Neff without having appropriately
served him with process, and the default judgment must be vacated.
The cases decided under the Full Faith and Credit Clause largely
reflected this analysis.47 Judgments against individuals made without
service of process were held to be void,48 while judgments against
property located in a state owned by an individual not within the state
were only treated as binding up to the value of the attached property.
49
The only obstacle to a holding that the lack of personal jurisdiction
rendered the initial judgment in Pennoyer invalid was the issue that, as
the Court rather delicately put it, many of the state opinions the Court
relied upon had language "implying that in [the rendering] [s]tate [the
judgment] may be valid and binding.",
50
As commentators have pointed out, the problematic language did
not so much imply as outright declare that the state that rendered a
judgment was free to assign whatever weight it wanted to such judgment
regardless of jurisdictional principles.51  Persi al jurisdiction only
became an issue when the plaintiff sought enforcement of the judgment
40. Id. at 722-28.
41. Id. at 729-32.
42. Id. at 733.
43. Id. at 722.
44. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 722.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 729-30.
48. Id. at 730.
49. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 730-31.
50. Id. at 732.
51. Conison, supra note 1, at 1103.
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in another state.52 What is more, this is a result that followed from the
nature of personal jurisdiction as an issue between sovereign states.
Personal jurisdiction has deep roots in principles of international comity,
a notion expressed in the Full Faith and Credit context by protecting one
state from being forced to respect the judgment of another when rendered
without jurisdiction. Those issues disappear when the rendering state
and the enforcing state are the same: Oregon courts hardly need a
federal doctrine to protect them from the depredations of Oregon courts.
The Court took two rather unconvincing cracks at this problem
before settling on a viable ground for its holding. First, the Court
suggested that the contrary language in state opinions was mere dicta;
53
the weight of the evidence assembled on the matter suggests that this
characterization is simply wrong.54 Second, the Court suggested that,
historically, same-state judgments could not be questioned for lack of
personal jurisdiction only because no mechanism existed for their
review, a defect remedied by the passage of the Fourteenth
Amendment.55 However, the inability to question same-state judgments
followed directly from the nature of personal jurisdiction as a tool for
mediating disputes between sovereigns. Finally, the Court held that
"proceedings in a court of justice to determine the personal rights and
obligations of parties over whom that court has no jurisdiction do not
constitute due process of law."56
The move to locate personal jurisdiction in the Due Process Clause
was relatively low-key, and remains underappreciated-not to mention
disputed57-to the present day. Such a shift necessarily entails a change
in focus from sovereign relations to individual rights, from protecting
California courts from being pushed around by Oregon courts to
protecting Californians from being forced to go to Oregon to defend
themselves.
Though the question is somewhat anachronistic, one gets a strong
sense that the Pennoyer Court would answer in the affirmative if asked
whether personal jurisdiction was a fundamental principle-the
requirement later settled on by the Supreme Court as the bar that must be
cleared for a right to be incorporated under due process-at least in the
context of the federalist structure of the United States.58 Considering that
52. Id.
53. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 732.
54. Conison, supra note 1, at 1103.
55. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 732.
56. Id. at 733.
57. See Conison, supra note 1, at 1209.
58. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 n.14 (1968). The Court noted:
Earlier the Court can be seen as having asked, when inquiring into whether
some particular procedural safeguard was required of a State, if a civilized
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courts of all levels had consistently affirmed the principle of requiring
personal jurisdiction before treating a judgment as valid for over 75
years at the time Pennoyer was decided, it is an understandable
conclusion to draw.
C. Pennoyer v. Neff. A Missed Opportunity
The Pennoyer Court relocated the center of gravity of the personal
jurisdiction inquiry to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. In so doing, the Court transformed what had been a
doctrine governing sovereign interactions into a doctrine protecting an
individual right. Unfortunately, the Court did not adapt the doctrine
itself to reflect this change in emphasis.
The Court did engage in one change to the pre-existing doctrine: it
applied the personal jurisdiction requirement to attempts to enforce a
judgment in the rendering state, not just in other states. This kind of
change is exactly what one would expect from the shift to an individual
right. If personal jurisdiction is to protect individuals from being haled
into distant courts, then all that should matter is the relationship between
the individual and the court that rendered the original decision. The
relationship between the enforcing court and the court that rendered the
judgment is irrelevant in assessing whether an individual right has been
violated. However, the Court did not choose to justify the change in the
operation of personal jurisdiction in this fashion, but instead chose to
pretend that the only change caused by the Fourteenth Amendment was
the availability of a means to challenge same-state judgments.60
It is understandable that the Pennoyer Court would have preferred
to leave the constitutional underpinnings of personal jurisdiction
relatively unexplored. The Court had recently decided the
Slaughterhouse Cases,61 and the proper interpretation of the Fourteenth
Amendment was a hot button issue-as, in other ways, it still is. Simply
expanding the applicability of a broadly accepted test for personal
jurisdiction-personal service of process-had the appeal of being
relatively uncontroversial. An extended discussion of the Constitutional
underpinnings of personal jurisdiction would have been more trouble
than it was worth.
system could be imagined that would not accord the particular protection....
The recent cases, on the other hand, have proceeded upon the valid assumption
that state criminal processes are not imaginary and theoretical schemes but
actual systems ....
Id.
59. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 733.
60. Id. at 732-33.
61. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873).
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After all, at the time it was decided, the Pennoyer rule perfectly
sufficed as a practical tool for deciding cases. In fact, a court in 1866
that anachronistically found itself bound to follow the modem cases on
personal jurisdiction-International Shoe v. Washington,62 World-Wide
Volkswagen v. Woodson,63 Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court,64
the whole lot-would as a practical matter likely have found no
difference than if it were simply bound by Pennoyer.65 In nineteenth
century America, people rarely engaged in activity that purposefully
affected something in another state. Starting with a requirement of
personal service and patching over obvious problem cases with a
fictional consent exception would allow a court to reach the right result
without any need to radically restructure a constitutional command. One
might draw an analogy to how one can solve most practical physical
problems-throwing a ball, merging into traffic, and so on-with a solid
intuitive grasp of Newtonian mechanics, even if a true understanding of
what is happening requires a comprehensive grasp of general relativity.
Nevertheless, the failure to appropriately explore the shift to
personal jurisdiction as an individual right embedded a very rigid
definition of personal jurisdiction into constitutional law.66 Eventually
this structure proved inadequate at handling new situations that arose as
technology advanced and presented more and more situations in which
the exercise of jurisdiction seemed appropriate despite the plaintiffs'
inability or failure to serve the defendant in the forum state. More than
anything else, this change in the facts on the ground forced the Supreme
Court to revisit the subject of personal jurisdiction in International
Shoe.67
II. REFINED INCORPORATION AND PERSONAL JURISDICTION
A. Incorporation and the Bill of Rights
Shifting the basis of personal jurisdiction from sovereign-to-
sovereign relations to the Fourteenth Amendment requires identifying the
individual right that personal jurisdiction protects. In so doing, it is
helpful to review the incorporation of the individual rights in the Bill of
Rights and how, in some cases, these individual rights were transformed
in the incorporation process.
62. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
63. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
64. Asahi Metal Indus. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
65. The elimination of in rem jurisdiction would of course have had a major effect.
Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
66. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722-23 (1878).
67. Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 311.
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The incorporation debate primarily focused on which rights to
include. Justice Black argued for full incorporation of the first eight
amendments,68 while Justice Frankfurter advocated a clause by clause
assessment of whether each right merited incorporation.69 In practice the
Supreme Court never settled on a fully coherent theory of incorporation,
though at present the Court has incorporated almost all of the rights that
appear in the Bill of Rights through individual analysis of whether each
right is fundamental.70
Professor Akhil Amar identified two key insights in his influential
article on the topic: first, the decision as to whether a right should be
incorporated ought to turn on whether it "really guarantees a privilege or
immunity of individual citizens rather than a right of states or the public
at large,"'" and second, that putting a right through the incorporation
process can result in a change to the right itself. As a right is
incorporated, Amar argues:
[W]e must be attentive to the possibility, flagged by Frankfurter, that
a particular principle in the Bill of Rights may change its shape in the
process of absorption into the Fourteenth Amendment .... Certain
hybrid provisions of the original Bill-part citizen right, part state
right-may need to shed their state-right husk before their citizen-
right core can be absorbed by the Fourteenth Amendment. 72
Amar described his approach to the problem as "refined incorporation.73
One example of refined incorporation in action took place in the
subtle transformation of the First Amendment right to peaceably
assemble. As originally understood, the right of "the people" peaceably
to assemble was linked up with popular sovereignty theory.74 The
paradigmatic example of "the people" assembling would have been
political rights holders gathering at a constitutional convention.5 By
1866 the term had grown to encompass those who were clearly not
political rights holders, including women and minorities.76
The incorporation of the Establishment Clause requires a similar
transformation. Under the original understanding, the First Amendment
is perfectly compatible with a state government establishing an official
religion and in fact would have prevented Congress from interfering with
68. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 74-75 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting).
69. Id. at 67-68 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
70. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 147-48 (1968).
71. Amar, supra note 4, at 1197.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1260.
74. Id. at 1282-83.
75. Id.
76. Amar, supra note 4, at 1282-83.
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the state churches of Connecticut and Massachusetts at the time of
ratification. The Supreme Court revisited that interpretation during the
incorporation of the Bill of Rights via the Fourteenth Amendment and
developed an individual right to separation between church and state. It
was only after the Amendment was passed through the prism of an
individual rights focus that it could serve as the foundation for the
Establishment Clause jurisprudence familiar to modem lawyers."
B. Taking a Refined Incorporation Approach to Personal Jurisdiction
The requirement of personal jurisdiction ought to undergo a similar
reinterpretation in light of the Fourteenth Amendment. State courts and
the Supreme Court originally developed a rule of personal jurisdiction in
the Full Faith and Credit context that primarily aimed at determining
when one sovereign would be required to honor the actions of another.
7 8
This rule also had the effect of protecting an individual from being haled
into a distant court and forced to defend himself.79 In the context of a
federalist system, courts should regard such a ground rule concerning
interaction between states and between states and citizens as fundamental
and ripe for incorporation.
The personal jurisdiction rule thus stood in need of a form of
refined incorporation: the aim of Full Faith and Credit Clause
jurisprudence may have been primarily to defend the sovereignty of the
enforcing government, but in so doing it also protected the right of the
individual to be free from coercive action by a foreign sovereign. The
incorporation process should have brought this secondary protection to
the forefront, establishing the personal jurisdiction requirement as a tool
for the protection of the right of the individual to be free from
illegitimate governmental coercive action.
The Pennoyer Court initiated the incorporation of the personal
jurisdiction requirement by shifting the foundation of the rule from
international law to individual rights. The Court altered the substance of
personal jurisdiction slightly to allow individuals to question the
jurisdiction of judgments even when such judgments were made by the
state now attempting to enforce them. 80 However, the Court shied away
from any further consideration of what such a shift should have entailed.
By leaving the constitutional connection between the Due Process
Clause and personal jurisdiction somewhat vague, the Court inhibited
77. Akhil Reed Amar, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 215-30 (1998) [hereinafter Amar, BILL
OF RIGHTS].
78. See supra notes 15-30 and accompanying text.
79. See supra notes 15-30 and accompanying text.
80. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 732 (1878).
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clear analysis of the content of the right protected by personal
jurisdiction. The Court's decision also had the effect of enshrining a
relatively rigid rule of personal jurisdiction as a constitutional rule.
In the ongoing evolution of the law from Pennoyer to International
Shoe to Nicastro, the Supreme Court has largely neglected to explain the
connection between the constitutional protection of due process and the
requirement of personal jurisdiction. As a result, while the common law
process of refinement has resulted in a generally reasonable rule
governing personal jurisdiction, there is little underlying the rule to
provide guidance for difficult cases. The absence of a satisfying
explanation for the personal jurisdiction requirement helps explain the
Court's inability to produce a solid majority opinion in the recent major
cases on the issue.
In essence, Pennoyer performed what Amar would describe as a
"jot-for-jot" incorporation, simply taking the existing rule and applying it
against the forum state. The modem line of cases, on the other hand,
attempts to start from scratch and develop a personal jurisdiction
requirement from the need for fair play.81 The Supreme Court has failed
to bring the two approaches together, and as a result has never managed
to identify the individual right protected by the pre-Pennoyer
jurisdictional rules.
What, then, is the kernel of the individual right contained within the
husk of the pre-Pennoyer rule of jurisdiction? Although "the right to
avoid the enforcement of judgments not supported by personal
jurisdiction" has the clean logical appeal of the tautology, such a tightly
defined right is difficult to identify in the Constitution or in the American
tradition. On the other hand, the right to something like "treatment
consistent with fair play and substantial justice" is the kind of noble ideal
that one might think of as a natural right, but such a vague standard oes
not clearly lead to modem jurisdictional rules. Attempting to derive a
concrete result from a series of euphemisms will not work. Courts
should instead directly approach the question of when jurisdiction is
appropriate without he intervening buffer of phrases like "fair play."
Referring back to the jurisdictional requirement as it was
understood in the time of Pennoyer, there were three primary
components: (1) the protection of one sovereign state from being forced
81. The common law process of refinement that began in International Shoe has of
course resulted in more specific requirements than simple fairness. However, when one
searches for the source of those detailed requirements, one eventually reaches the
command of ensuring fair play and substantial justice. Thus, any question that forces the
Supreme Court to reach outside of the constructed framework of the common law of
personal jurisdiction results in individual Justices being left largely to rule on their
individual conception of fairness.
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to honor an invalid judgment of another sovereign; (2) a general right to
notice and an opportunity to be heard before judgment; and (3) the
limitation of appropriate notice to include only personal service while in
the forum in question. The first of these protections is the state-focused
husk that ought to be disregarded as part of the Fourteenth Amendment
inquiry. The second is protected by procedural due process. It is the
third component that provides the basis for a unique individual right: a
sort of right to be free from arbitrary assertions of government power-
in particular the right to remain untouched by baseless assertions of
power by foreign states.82 Such a right fits neatly into the American
tradition and also leads to the modem rule of personal jurisdiction in a
rather straightforward fashion. 83
The rights identified in the Bill of Rights generally place certain
acts beyond the reach of any government or prohibit any government
from taking certain actions. Another way to characterize this would be
to say that most of these rights are substantive.84 The First Amendment
protects freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of religion,
and the right of the people to peaceably assemble. The Fourth
Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. There is no
suggestion that some states or some departments of the federal
government are free to penalize speech or grant general warrants while
some are not. Entire areas of regulation are simply off limits for the
government generally once such rights have been incorporated via the
Fourteenth Amendment.
On the other hand, the right to be free from the exertion of power by
a foreign government is more procedural in nature. In defining such a
right, no claim is being made that the individual should be beyond all
government assertions of power. The right simply seeks to restrict which
government may assert power over the individual.
While such a right is distinct in some ways from the rights written
into the Bill of Rights, the right would hardly be foreign to early
American thought. As an initial matter, one might note that the country
adopting the Constitution had only recently finished fighting a war over
perceived illegitimate assertions of power by a distant government.
Protecting citizens from attempts by the states to engage in similar
82. This right could, in practice, be quite similar to the right to remain unaffiliated
with a sovereign that Professor Stewart has suggested is implicit in the Constitutional
structure. Margaret G. Stewart, A New Litany of Personal Jurisdiction, 60 U. COLO. L.
REv. 5, 18 (1989).
83. Id.
84. One might argue that the Framers viewed these protections as in some sense
procedural, but the modem view of these rights as incorporated is firmly substantive. See
generally Amar, supra note 4; Amar, BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 77.
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abuses would be entirely consistent with that experience. In addition,
much of the Constitution can be seen as addressing concerns regarding
the division of power. The Constitution grants the federal government
supremacy in certain areas, while state governments are left with the
general police power; further, it subdivides the power of the federal
government between its constituent branches. The idea of a right
concerned with the division of power between states fits naturally with
such provisions.
The most compelling evidence that such a right would be consistent
with Founding-era thinking is the fact that courts worked to protect the
right despite the lack of an explicit constitutional provision. Following
the lead of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in Bissel v. Briggs,
most state courts-and eventually the Supreme Court-held it to be
obvious that judgments lacking jurisdiction were not entitled to Full
Faith and Credit. While courts may have been motivated to render such
judgments by a desire to protect state sovereignty, as a practical matter,
state sovereignty could only be protected by protecting individuals from
the effects of such judgments.
1. Defining the Scope of the Right
Generally speaking, defining a constitutional right is not a simple
binary endeavor. One cannot simply chart out a list of situations in
which the right applies and a list of those where it does not. Rather, it is
more helpful to think in terms of a core area, in which the right applies
most strongly, and a sort of fringe area, where the right arguably applies
but must often give way to other considerations. Of course, all rights do
have limits and situations in which they do not apply.
The public forum doctrine associated with the First Amendment
reflects such a structure.85 In "quintessential public forums," the
government is limited to "regulations of the time, place, and manner of
expression which are content-neutral, are narrowly tailored to serve a
significant government interest, and leave open ample alternative
channels of communication[]" and to content-based exclusions that are
"necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly
drawn to achieve that end."86 Public property that the state has opened
for use by the public as a place for expressive activity may be shut down
completely if the state so desires; if it chooses not to do so, it is subject to
similar restrictions as with traditional public forums.87  By contrast,
property owned by the government that is not a forum for public
85. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
86. Id. at 45.
87. Id.
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communication is subject to much looser restrictions: "the [s]tate may
reserve the forum for its intended purposes, communicative or otherwise,
as long as the regulation on speech is reasonable and not an effort to
suppress expression merely because public officials oppose the speaker's
view., 88 Some forms of activity, such as shooting somebody in the head
over a difference of opinion, though arguably expressive, receive no
protection whatsoever from the First Amendment.
In the area of personal jurisdiction, the core right must be
preventing assertions of jurisdiction by states that have no connection to
either the defendant or to the activity that gave rise to the cause of
action.89 In a federal system, citizens should be able to exercise at least
some control over which entities may pass judgment on them. Forcing
an individual to answer to a state with which the individual has never
interacted and in which he arguably has never even caused harm is
beyond the pale.90  To require individuals to respond to arbitrary
complaints filed in any of the 50 states would make a mockery of the
Full Faith and Credit Clause.
On the other hand, the right clearly does not apply in the home state
of the rights holder. The purpose of the right is protection from the
arbitrary exercise of authority, but authority exercised by the sovereign
governing an individual's home can hardly be arbitrary. This lack of
arbitrariness justifies so-called "general jurisdiction"-there is no
requirement to show a connection between the case and the forum when
the defendant has no right to avoid assertions of authority by the forum.91
The intermediate terrain of the right to be left alone involves states
where the defendant does not reside but where the defendant has
conducted some activity or arguably caused some harm. This is the
realm of specific jurisdiction. Much can be written regarding the
requirements of specific jurisdiction, but framing the question in terms of
an individual right clarifies a few things.
First, if the defendant conducts activities in a state, it seems
improper to allow suit to be brought concerning unrelated activities,
while related activities are fair game.92  Precisely how closely the
activities must be related is difficult to define, although one can again
start with clear examples and gradually move into more difficult
territory. If a product manufactured in Maryland explodes in Delaware
and injures a plaintiff, it seems the plaintiff must be able to bring suit in
Maryland, even if the plaintiff's theory of the case does not include an
88. Id. at 46.
89. See Stewart, supra note 82, at 18.
90. See id.
91. See id. at 20.
92. See id. at 19.
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allegation of manufacturing defect. The very product complained of was
produced in the state of Maryland, after all.93 However, if the defendant
operates multiple factories, and the plaintiff brings suit in a state other
than the one where the product was built (or the plaintiff does not
identify which factory produced the product), the answer is less clear.
One could argue that the defendant who operates a manufacturing plant
in a state should not be permitted to avoid a suit relating to the product
being manufactured. Alternatively, one could argue that a suit regarding
a particular item should not be permitted to proceed in a state that has no
connection to that item. Framing the question in terms of an individual
right does not reveal an easy answer to all questions, but it does direct
the analysis more helpfully than a broad based inquiry into "fair play and
substantial justice."
This framing also suggests that a defendant who directs activity
towards a particular state that causes harm in that state ought not be able
to avoid the courts of that state.9 4 It is hardly arbitrary for a state to
assert power over a defendant whose deliberate acts have harmed a
resident of the state.
Activity that may foreseeably have an effect in a given state
presents a more difficult question. This is the question presented by the
so-called "stream of commerce" cases.95 When a defendant takes an
action that has a chance of affecting residents of a state, has the
defendant assumed the risk that the action will cause harm and create a
jurisdictional association? Such a position seems inconsistent with a
focus on deliberate associative action by the defendant.
96
Rather than focusing on including limitations as part of the
definition of the right, it might be more natural to define the right to
cover a broad scope of behavior, while carving out separate areas where
the right does not apply. The following section will attempt to derive a
reasonable approach to identifying the far reaches of the right underlying
personal jurisdiction.
93. Such a situation may seem contrived, but the Supreme Court would have been
faced with just this question if the manufacturer had not conceded jurisdiction in World-
Wide Volkswagen. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 288
(1980).
94. See Stewart, supra note 82, at 20-21.
95. See, e.g., Asahi Metal Indus. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 105 (1987); J.
McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2785 (2011).
96. See Stewart, supra note 82, at 33-34.
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2. Identifying Limitations on the Right
a. Relatively Narrowly Defined Right
Constitutional rights are not absolute. Even our most cherished
rights must give way if the government is able to identify a reason to
override them that passes strict scrutiny.97 When dealing with rights that
are not as well established, or applications of established rights that are
on the fringe of the area that they cover, the government may often
overcome them by demonstrating that its proposed actions pass some
intermediate level of scrutiny.
98
Translating this type of analysis into the area of personal
jurisdiction is not straightforward. The idea of weighing the
government's interest in an assertion of power against an individual's
constitutional right is awkward when the right itself is the independence
from governmental assertions of power. It's a funny way of protecting
individuals from the arbitrary assertion of government power when the
government is allowed to exert power whenever it is able to convince a
court that it is really important that the government be allowed to do so.
However, the task is not impossible. The situation here is not
comparable to prosecutorial immunity, where searching judicial scrutiny
of a privilege is tantamount to destroying the privilege. Fully and fairly
litigating the issue of personal jurisdiction deprives the defendant of
some of the protections provided by the requirement-such as freedom
from suit-but ultimately the court will be able to provide the protection
from the assertion of authority that makes up the core of the right, if such
protection is appropriate.
While the requirement of personal jurisdiction does not create an
absolute bar to the consideration of governmental interests, the nature of
the right precludes some interests from consideration. After all, every
government has an interest in asserting universal jurisdiction, if only to
provide a convenient forum for plaintiffs in the state to vindicate their
rights. However, allowing such a generalized interest to count against
the protection provided by the requirement of personal jurisdiction seems
to run counter to the very existence of the requirement to begin with.
That is to say, the existence of a requirement of personal jurisdiction
suggests that the justification for universal jurisdiction for each state in
the United States was found wanting on a systemic level, so it seems
misguided to allow such a justification to weigh in the balance of
administering the right on a retail level.
97. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326-28 (2003).
98. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
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In order to be considered an interest that might outweigh the
individual right to be free from foreign assertions of power-thus
allowing a finding of personal jurisdiction-the state must identify
something about the particular case at hand that gives rise to the interest.
For example, if the defendant sold bicycle tire inflation valves that ended
up in the forum state, the state may have an interest in hosting a suit to
ensure that products that do harm within the state are judged according to
the state's standards.
Evaluating such claims could be a difficult matter, but it will at least
clear the air somewhat to eliminate the universal claims that would
support the exercise of jurisdiction in all cases.
b. Broad Right, Easily Waived
Another way to conceive of the landscape of personal jurisdiction is
to take a very broad interpretation of the right, while treating certain
substantive behaviors as waivers of the right.99 According to this view,
the "core right" prevents all of the states that are not the defendant's
residence from asserting authority over the defendant.100 However, a
court will treat a decision to, for example, sell insurance in a foreign state
as a waiver of the right to avoid assertions of jurisdiction in that state, at
least as to the insurance being sold. 101
As is so often the case with attempts to address thorny legal issues,
this simplifies one area of the analysis while complicating the other.
Taking this approach allows one to avoid the tricky task of precisely
delineating the extent of the right to be left alone, but creates the new
problem of defining what constitutes a waiver, and how broadly such
waivers should be interpreted. 1
02
Waiver in this context is necessarily somewhat fictional. Knowing
waiver of a right typically involves some kind of declaration to a
government entity, such as the decision to speak to a police officer after
being apprised of the right to remain silent10 3 or the failure to assert a
personal right at the appropriate stage of a judicial proceeding.'04
Waiver of personal jurisdiction, on the other hand, involves primary
behavior that is rarely directed at a governmental entity, and almost
never involves a conscious and deliberate decision to give up the right
99. See Stewart, supra note 82, at 18.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 16-17.
103. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966).
104. FED. R. CIv. P. 12(b)(2).
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not to be sued in the forum.10 5 Usually, a court is asked to decide
whether an action, taken for some other personal or business purpose,
may be treated as consent. This question, it should be emphasized,
cannot deal with actual consent-such an inquiry would be hopelessly
circular, as a legally knowledgeable citizen would subjectively believe
herself to be consenting to jurisdiction only when taking actions that
courts have deemed to indicate such consent. 106 However, this does not
mean that the inquiry is hopeless.
Asking, "is it fair to treat this behavior as consent to jurisdiction"-
or as a submission to sovereignty, as Justice Kennedy prefersl°7-is a
different question than, "is it fair to exercise jurisdiction over this
defendant," even if the end result is the same. Focusing on constructive
consent forces the court to find its justifications for the exercise of
jurisdiction in the defendant's behavior, rather than in the state's need.
So what actions should be treated as consent to jurisdiction?
Consider that the starting point is the right to be left alone by foreign
states. It seems only fair to require that people expecting to benefit from
this right should themselves leave the foreign state alone. Someone who
makes a deliberate decision to target her actions to a particular state
ought to understand that by doing so she loses the right to complain
about "arbitrary" assertions of power by that state over those activities.
On the other hand, analyzing the issue of personal jurisdiction
through the lens of constructive consent supports the idea of partial
association with a foreign sovereign.'08 That is, while it seems perfectly
fair to treat the sale of widgets into a foreign state as consent to
jurisdiction in a suit over the widgets, it seems like a stretch to allow the
foreign state to exercise jurisdiction over unrelated suits-for example,
personal injury suits over behavior occurring in a different state.
10 9
When the defendant's activity is not directed at the foreign state, no
principle of reciprocity is available to justify an assertion of jurisdiction
over the defendant.
Even this simple distinction can get tricky when one attempts to pin
down the precise meaning of directing activity at the foreign state. This
issue has split the Supreme Court in several cases. One contingent
argues that placing an item in the "stream of commerce" that arrives in a
105. There are of course situations where a corporation may agree to be amenable to
suit in a state in exchange for a business license and the like, but those cases do not
occupy much attention when it comes to the analysis of the scope of personal jurisdiction.
See Stewart, supra note 82, at 16-17.
106. See World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 311 n.18 (1980)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
107. See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2787 (2011).
108. See Stewart, supra note 82, at 21.
109. See id. at 22.
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foreign state is directing activity at a state, while the other contingent
contends that only purposeful direction at the foreign state will suffice. " 0
These two tests, however, do not cover the entire range of possible tests.
One might also believe that any action that has effects in a foreign state
constitutes a waiver of the right to be free from that state's exercise of
jurisdiction.
The so-called "effects test" differs from the "stream of commerce"
test in that the effects test does not cut off the creation of jurisdiction at
the point of sale."' If an item is sold in New York and taken by the
consumer to Arizona, where it allegedly causes harm due to a product
defect, only the effects test would countenance jurisdiction in Arizona.
If the exercise of jurisdiction requires constructive waiver, then the
effects test and stream of commerce test are difficult to justify.
Constructive waiver inherently requires an analysis of fairness and the
defendant's state of mind. If the defendant never even thought of the
foreign state at the time that he acted, it is hard to see how his actions
could constitute consent to that state's exercise of jurisdiction.12 There
is a difference between an act that will certainly affect a particular state
and an act that could only possibly affect that state.
C. Alternatives to the Refined Incorporation Approach
Commentators have proposed many alternatives to the Court's
personal jurisdiction doctrine, including the possibility of eliminating it
altogether. In this section, the Article will examine how the individual
right produced by the refined incorporation approach stands up in light of
these alternatives.
1. Eliminating Personal Jurisdiction
One critique of personal jurisdiction as a constitutional command is
the idea that the subject matter is simply not important enough to require
a constitutional command."3 In other words, personal jurisdiction is a
"solution in search of a problem" ' 114 that courts should either drop
entirely or fold into a more general inquiry into which litigation forum is
most convenient for both parties. 115
110. See generally Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780; Asahi Metal Indus. v. Superior Court,
480 U.S. 102 (1987).
111. See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 305-06 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
112. Massive effects might be vulnerable to a sort of willful blindness exception, but
the canon of cases advocating for the stream of commerce test hardly fit that description.
113. See Conison, supra note 1, at 1209.
114. See Perdue, supra note 1, at 530.
115. See id. at 561-62.
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The idea that unimportant rights generally do not receive protection
under the Due Process Clause holds some merit. Consider the fact that
the Third Amendment prohibition on quartering soldiers and the Fifth
Amendment requirement of a grand jury indictment are among the few
rights mentioned in the Bill of Rights not incorporated against the
states."6 For all of the effort expended to explain the incorporation
process, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the reason those
particular provisions have not been incorporated is because they are seen
as unimportant."7 If the personal jurisdiction requirement protects a
similarly unimportant right, then the idea that personal jurisdiction
springs from the incorporation of an individual right is hard to justify.
Coming up with a test for which rights are important and which are
not is a little tricky. Science has yet to produce an instrument capable of
detecting something as intangible as an individual right, let alone one
that could weigh the importance of such a thing. It might be tempting to
conduct a poll of trained philosophers, but that seems unlikely to have
persuasive force. 1 8 However, certain secondary effects associated with
importance can be observed and used to infer the relative stature of any
given right.
As to the Third Amendment, the issue of quartering soldiers simply
does not arise very often. Whether because the constitutional command
is so clear or because quartering soldiers in private homes has turned out
to be an inefficient way to house troops, there has been little cause for
anybody to bring a suit alleging a violation of the Third Amendment.
Whatever else one might say about personal jurisdiction, the doctrine
does not suffer from a lack of contested cases. Personal jurisdiction
lurks as a potential issue in any civil suit and has proven an important
issue with enough frequency to produce a multitude of Supreme Court
opinions. 119
The grand jury requirement is an issue that often arises yet has not
led to incorporation. Here, the lack of importance has to do with the
effect of the requirement: while the Founding generation may have
believed that grand juries would provide a useful check on overzealous
prosecutors, practical experience shows that they have little if any effect.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court feels no need to incorporate a
requirement that would ultimately accomplish nothing.
116. C.f id. at 203-04 (concluding that there is no defensible theoretical basis for the
non-incorporation of such rights).
117. See Perdue, supra note 1, at 561; Redish, supra note 1, at 1137.
118. Although one might argue that a poll of nine such philosophers is the actual
process used in evaluating the importance of any given right, one would also be forced to
concede that this process is hardly universally applauded.
119. See infra Part III.
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Personal jurisdiction does not suffer from this form of irrelevance
either. While a third party observer may frequently be indifferent to the
venue that hears any particular civil suit, the parties themselves often
care a great deal. For example, in patent litigation, where the choice of
jurisdiction is relatively unconstrained, a highly disproportionate number
of plaintiffs choose to file in the Eastern District of Texas.120 Although
the Eastern District of Texas is part of the federal court system and
subject to the same laws as any other court, plaintiffs' attorneys seem to
believe there is an advantage in having their suits heard in that
location. 2' The existence of a personal jurisdiction requirement helps
prevent such a strategy from taking hold in all high stakes civil litigation.
Personal jurisdiction comes up frequently in civil cases and
significantly affects how they are decided. In neither sense can personal
jurisdiction be called unimportant as compared to the portions of the Bill
of Rights that remain unincorporated. I would go further and claim that
even a neutral third party observer should care about the right that the
personal jurisdiction requirement protects. The idea that a foreign
tribunal should not be able to summon an individual to be held to foreign
standards and judged by foreign mores is compelling, and resonates
strongly in the American tradition. The fact that the foreign state at issue
may be Oregon rather than Iran lessens the need for such protection, but
the very nature of a federal system recognizes that different localities
have different customs and standards.
2. Divorcing Personal Jurisdiction from Due Process
Another possible complaint is the charge that the Court in Pennoyer
simply got things wrong. On this view, whether because Justice Field
had an agenda1 22 or because the Pennoyer Court simply misunderstood
existing law,123 treating personal jurisdiction as a personal right in any
way constitutes an unwarranted interpretation of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 1
24
120. See Carlos Perez-Albuerne & Gwen G. Nolan, Eastern District of Texas-
Plaintiffs' Paradise Lost? LAw360 (Sept. 15, 2010),
http://www.law360.com/articles/190606/ (reporting that in 2008, over 10% of all patent
cases in the United States were filed in the Eastern District of Texas).
121. See Yan Leychkis, Of Fire Ants and Claim Construction: An Empirical Study of
the Meteoric Rise of the Eastern District of Texas as a Preeminent Forum for Patent
Litigation, 9 YALE J.L. & TECH. 193, 206 (2007).
122. See generally Adrian M. Tocklin, Pennoyer v. Neff. The Hidden Agenda of
Stephen J. Field, 28 SETON HALL L. REv. 75 (1997).
123. See Whitten, Due Process, supra note 1, at 821.
124. See Conison, supra note 1, at 1209 (describing personal jurisdiction as "spurious
constitutional law").
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Often commentators have paired this critique with an attack on the
federalism theme of personal jurisdiction. '25 As they point out, a perusal
of the debates surrounding the Fourteenth Amendment reveals no
discussion of personal jurisdiction. 126 In addition, the Court's insistence
that personal jurisdiction is an individual right is quite difficult to square
with a focus on state interests. 1
2 7
As to the intent of the drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment, one
must note that. in general, a mention in the debates surrounding the
Amendment has not been viewed as a prerequisite for incorporation. Nor
should it have been; the debate was conducted in general terms, befitting
an Amendment intended to create a general shift in the relationship
between states and the federal government. 
128
While a direct weighing of an interest in federalism indeed should
not be part of the due process analysis, this does not mean that federalism
is irrelevant to jurisdiction. Rather, the development of personal
jurisdiction in the context of the Full Faith and Credit Clause indicates
that personal jurisdiction is a fundamental right meriting Fourteenth
Amendment protection and that development was heavily influenced by
the concept of federalism. 1
29
It is difficult to contradict the claim that the Pennoyer Court was
doing something new. The then-existing personal jurisdiction doctrine
fairly clearly established that jurisdiction existed primarily as an
international law doctrine.130 Accordingly, the doctrine primarily acted
to release the forum state from being required to recognize foreign
judgments; however, the doctrine did not act to prevent the forum from
recognizing judgments of its own. 13 1  Thus, a simple "jot-for-jot"
incorporation of personal jurisdiction would not allow for a successful
challenge against the enforcement of a judgment by a court in the state in
which it was made, as happened in Pennoyer.
The fact that Pennoyer departed from the traditional rule, however,
does not mean that it was a mistake. The Reconstruction Amendments
worked a massive shift in the relationship between the individual citizen,
his state government, and the federal government. Where the Founding
generation assumed to a certain extent that the primary threat to liberty
would come from an overweening federal government, following the
125. See Redish, supra note 1, at 1136-37; Drobak, supra note 1, at 1017.
126. See Redish, supra note 1, at 1124-26.
127. See id. at 1136-37.
128. See Amar, supra note 4, at 1233.
129. See supra Parts .A, II.B.




Civil War the concern shifted to recalcitrant state governments. 132 That
change in focus drove the need for a refined incorporation process.
Jurisdictional rules, though rooted in concerns for sovereignty,
always acted to protect individuals from the enforcement of invalid
judgments. The Fourteenth Amendment extended that protection into the
forums that had reached such invalid judgments. This was a change
from the traditional rule, but that should hardly be surprising: the
Fourteenth Amendment was intended to, and did, change many
traditional rules.
3. Beginning from State Power
Professor Brilmayer has suggested another approach to personal
jurisdiction, arguing that courts ought to view personal jurisdiction as a
problem of identifying the proper scope of state authority. 133 She argues
that the "right of a state to assert adjudicatory.. . authority over
interstate disputes or over residents of other states who claim to have
insufficient contact with the forum court attempting to exercise
authority" should determine the reach of personal jurisdiction.134 On this
view, "[c]ases that are outside the state's jurisdiction . . . are cases that
are beyond the legitimate exercise of coercive power."
135
One issue with such an approach is that it suggests the need for a
complete theory of the legitimate exercise of state power before courts
can derive a doctrine of personal jurisdiction therefrom.136 Such a theory
has been hard to come by: the question of the proper scope of state
power has occupied philosophers from Plato to Rawls and has been a
hotly contested issue for most of that time. If that debate requires an
answer before anybody can determine the proper scope of personal
jurisdiction, we could be in for a long slog. 137
In addition, even if one were to settle that debate-or if a court were
simply to pick a winning theory in the name of expedience-
considerable difficulty remains in translating an abstract theory into
concrete results. Adopting Rawls's veil of ignorance does not obviously
lead to an answer to the question of whether New Hampshire, for
132. See Amar, supra note 4, at 1233.
133. Lea Brilmayer, Jurisdictional Due Process and Political Theory, 39 U. FLA. L.
REv. 293, 294 (1987) [hereinafter Brilmayer, Political Theory]; see also Lea Brilmayer,
Shaping and Sharing in Democratic Theory: Towards a Political Philosophy of Interstate
Equality, 15 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 389, 411 (1987); Lea Brilmayer, Liberalism,
Community, and State Borders, 41 DuKE L.J. 1, 4-6 (1991) [hereinafter Brilmayer,
Liberalism].
134. Brilmayer, Political Theory, supra note 133, at 294.
135. Id. at 295.
136. See id. at 294.
137. Perdue, supra note 1, at 546.
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example, may exercise jurisdiction over the manufacturer of widgets who
sells exclusively in Vermont, but whose widgets are used to make
gadgets sold in New Hampshire. 138
Taking as a starting point an individual right developed through a
refined incorporation process helps to ameliorate this problem. One
subtle but important change resulting from such an analysis is to view the
right from the perspective of the individual rights holder. The Supreme
Court cases that put a heavy emphasis on the federalism requirement
have tended to treat the individual right as merely the flip side of the
limits of state power, 1 39 a treatment that academics continue to follow. 
40
On one level, this is a simple tautology-the individual is naturally free
from the interference that the state is forbidden to pursue-but the
change in perspective to focus on individual rights as demanded by the
Due Process Clause changes the form of the analysis.
First, there is a matter of emphasis, or of default assumptions.
States, by nature, exercise power. When addressing the philosophical
question of the proper exercise of state power, there is a sort of
gravitational pull to the formulation of "the state may exercise power
unless. .. ." That conception embeds the idea that exercising power is
the default assumption and that unless something displaces that
assumption the state may do what it wants. On the other hand, starting
from an individual rights perspective tends towards the opposite
assumption: "the individual is to be free from state interference
unless ..... " This represents the default assumption that the individual's
right is to be respected unless some overriding concern justifies setting
the right aside. Choosing the perspective from which to analyze the
issue is naturally bound up in the result of the final analysis.
The idea that an individual right can be analyzed by delineating
what the state may do, with the leftover area being the right of the
individual, echoes the argument that the Bill of Rights was unnecessary
because of the limited powers of the federal government.141 On that
138. Seeid. at 547.
139. See World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 294 (1980)
(describing how the Due Process clause "instrument of interstate federalism, may
sometimes act to divest the State of its power to render a valid judgment" without
reference to an individual right); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958)
(describing personal jurisdiction as in part "a consequence of territorial limitations on the
power of the respective States").
140. See Brilmayer, Political Theory, supra note 133, at 293-95.
141. THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 513 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter
ed.,1961). Hamilton asserted:
I go further, and affirm that bills of rights, in the sense and in the extent in
which they are contended for, are not only unnecessary in the proposed
constitution, but would even be dangerous. They would contain various
exceptions to powers which are not granted; and on this very account, would
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view, there was no need to specify that the government may not infringe
on the freedom of speech when the government had no power to restrict
speech. While such an argument is logically compelling, it did not
prevail. The Constitution ultimately adopted what one might call a belt-
and-suspenders approach to protecting against tyranny: it created a
government of limited powers and also described a list of protected
individual rights. A similar approach is warranted in the matter of
personal jurisdiction. While it may be useful, as an initial matter, to
consider what a government may or may not do, it is also helpful to
consider from an individual perspective what sorts of behavior ought to
be guaranteed Constitutional protection.
Consider the First Amendment. There, too, it is necessarily true
that the individual's freedom from governmental interference with
speech is the residue left over once all of the areas of speech with which
the government may interfere have been determined. But we generally
do not speak of free speech rights in that manner: there are areas where
the government is allowed to interfere, such as the shouting of "fire" in a
crowded theater and the like; areas that are clearly protected speech; and
grey areas where courts and commentators may debate whether the
speech is protected.
The same paradigm should apply in analyzing personal jurisdiction.
If an individual has a right not to answer to a remote state, we should not
begin from a first principles analysis of state power. We should begin by
asking whether the individual has done anything that justifies the
removal of the protection from the foreign state.
4. A Note on Personal Jurisdiction as an Individual Right
A shared feature of the alternate approaches detailed in this section
is a de-emphasis of the idea that the personal jurisdiction requirement
protects an individual right.1 42  The Supreme Court's occasional
imprecision in describing what it is doing with the personal jurisdiction
inquiry 143 may appear to lend support to this view. However, on balance,
the treatment of personal jurisdiction is highly consistent with the view
that it is an individual right. While it is possible for the Supreme Court
afford a colorable pretext to claim more than were granted. For why declare
that things shall not be done which there is no power to do?
Id.
142. See Conison, supra note 1, at 1193.
143. See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 294 (describing how the Due Process
clause "instrument of interstate federalism, may sometimes act to divest the State of its
power to render a valid judgment" without reference to an individual right); Hanson, 357
U.S. at 251 (describing personal jurisdiction as in part "a consequence of territorial
limitations on the power of the respective States").
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to be in error in its interpretation of the Constitution, this history at least
suggests as a practical matter that a retreat on the subject is unlikely.
The personal jurisdiction requirement, as developed by the Supreme
Court, has all of the trappings of a personal right. The requirement is not
treated as some prophylactic measure intended to prevent the state of
Oregon from invading the domain of the state of California;144 rather, it
is intended to protect individuals from abusive behavior by foreign
states. Although the Supreme Court has not identified the right protected
by the personal jurisdiction inquiry, other than some guarantee of
"fairness," both the substance of the personal jurisdiction requirement
and the procedure by which it is enforced confirm that it is some kind
individual right. 1
45
The substance of the personal jurisdiction requirement is much
more consistent with the idea that the requirement is an individual right
than with the idea that the requirement is intended to pursue a purely
structural interest. Although the Supreme Court has not settled on a
single test for personal jurisdiction, the centerpiece for all of the recently
proposed approaches is a focus on the contacts between the defendant
and the forum state. 146 The Court has paid lip service to the idea that the
forum state's interest in deciding a case could justify jurisdiction, but in
practice it seems to be used only to disqualify exercises of jurisdiction
rather than support them. 147 The interest of the defendant's home state in
shielding its citizens from foreign exertions of jurisdiction has at most
been obliquely protected by the invocation of the interest of the
"interstate judicial system,"148 which itself seems to be a rote part of the
modem "litany of personal jurisdiction" rather than an actual factor in
deciding cases.149  The strong focus on a factor tied to individual
behavior and the deprecation of factors tied to state interests is of course
consistent with the protection of an individual right.
The procedural treatment of personal jurisdiction reinforces this
view, particularly when it is compared to the treatment of subject matter
jurisdiction. The defendant must bring any deficiency of personal
144. As commentators have observed, it is highly unlikely in most personal
jurisdiction disputes that either state government particularly cares about the result.
145. The Supreme Court has specifically identified the personal jurisdiction
requirement as a personal right. See Ins. Co. of Ir. v. Compagnie Des Bauxites, 456 U.S.
694, 703 (1982). However the Court's inconsistent handling of the right over time has
somewhat obscured that fundamental truth.
146. The heated dispute in the Supreme Court is about what contacts should count.
Compare J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2787-90 (2011) with
Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2799-803 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
147. See Asahi Metal Indus. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 114 (1987).
148. See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292.
149. See Stewart, supra note 82, at 6.
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jurisdiction to the court's attention. 150 Failure to timely do so will result
in the waiver of the right. 15' This is exactly what one would expect if the
purpose of the right is to act as a shield for the defendant: if the
defendant wants to use the right, he has to invoke it; if he does not want
its protection, he is free to forego it. By contrast, subject matter
jurisdiction is inherently structural: the purpose is explicitly to protect
the proper allocation of power between the state and federal
governments, rather than any particular defendant's interest in having the
proper court evaluate his arguments.152  Accordingly, no matter how
badly the parties might like a federal court to decide certain issues, the
court must refuse to behave in a manner that intrudes on a matter
properly left for state courts to decide.5 3  Individuals may not waive
subject matter jurisdiction issues, and courts may even raise such issues
sua sponte.154 One would expect courts to treat the personal jurisdiction
requirement the same way if it performed a similarly important role in
policing interstate relations; the fact that they do not strongly suggests
that the personal jurisdiction requirement protects an individual right.
Further examination of the difference in the treatment of the
personal jurisdiction requirement and the subject matter jurisdiction
requirement helps illuminate the idea that personal jurisdiction springs
from a personal right. One might be tempted to begin and end with the
observation that one doctrine evaluates the subject matter of the suit
while the other evaluates the fairness of haling the defendant into court:
two different problems that have historically been treated quite
differently. Yet, when dealing with constitutional issues it is often
rewarding to ask why certain distinctions matter while others do not.
After all, both situations present an allegation that the actions of party B
have harmed party A, and in both situations the court party A is
petitioning must determine whether it may properly exercise power over
the dispute.
Establishing the federal government and defining its relationship to
state governments is the central concern of the Constitution.1 55 That
relationship has been highly fraught throughout the history of the
country, at one point leading to civil war, and even today remains a
contentious political issue. 156 Federal subject matter jurisdiction touches
150. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2).
151. See Ins. Co. of Ir. v. Compagnie Des Bauxites, 456 U.S. 694, 703 (1982).
152. See Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908).
153. See id.
154. See id.
155. See THE FEDERALIST No. 1 (Alexander Hamilton).
156. See generally, e.g., Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566
(2012).
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directly on the issue of when and how the federal government may
directly exercise power over an individual and therefore implicates that
inter-governmental relationship.
Another issue is the extent of the possible conflict between the two
sovereigns. If there were no constraint on subject matter jurisdiction,
federal courts could in theory absorb every case that would otherwise go
to the state courts. One might even say that federal courts would likely
do so, depending on the structure of removal jurisdiction in such a
scenario: at the very least, all of the cases where the plaintiff expects to
do better in federal court would be in federal court. On the other hand,
even if the requirement for personal jurisdiction were to disappear, one
would expect neighboring states to usurp a relatively limited quantity of
cases.
While federal-state conflicts have been the drivers behind many
major constitutional issues, inter-state conflict has been much lower key.
Though such conflicts exist, they have hardly been major issues on a
national level. '
57
The difference in the stakes of the inter-governmental relations
involved can explain the difference in the treatment of these issues on a
procedural level. The relationship between the state and federal
government is a highly charged issue, meaning that determinations of
subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be left to the parties in a suit. On the
other hand, the relationships between states are not particularly fraught,
and to the extent that states do have contentious relationships, they do
not usually implicate jurisdictional issues, so personal jurisdiction is left
to the parties.
If the personal jurisdiction doctrine polices a jurisdictional
boundary that the sovereigns involved find unimportant, one might be
tempted to do away with the doctrine altogether. Or at least to greatly
relax the requirements of personal jurisdiction until they operate as a sort
of national forum non conveniens rule-something to police
gamesmanship by litigants rather than a strict constitutional command. 1
5 8
However, such an impulse overlooks one thing that personal jurisdiction
has going for it that subject matter jurisdiction lacks: the intuitive appeal
of the defendant's argument. The idea that a citizen should be able to
arrange her life so as to avoid the interference of the federal government
is not going to get much traction with a modern audience. If the
individual chooses to engage in behavior that the federal government has
regulated, then it is only to be expected that the federal government will
exercise jurisdiction over any resulting suit. But when it comes to
157. See, e.g., New Jersey v. Delaware, 291 U.S. 361 (1934).
158. See, e.g., Perdue, supra note 1, at 572.
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personal jurisdiction, things are different: here courts must be concerned
with "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."1
59
This is a distinction that expresses itself primarily in the substance
of the two doctrines. Subject matter jurisdiction concerns itself with the
primary behavior of the defendant but does not worry at all about his
purpose or intent. Rather, all that matters is whether federal law governs
the behavior at issue. Fairness has no place in such an inquiry. In a
personal jurisdiction inquiry, on the other hand, fairness to the defendant
becomes a paramount concern.
The difference in substance supports the difference in procedural
treatment: the defendant's choice not to raise the issue of jurisdiction
suggests that he defendant believes he will be fairly treated by the
presiding court. When the jurisdictional inquiry aims to police the
boundary between two sovereigns, that belief is irrelevant; on the other
hand, if fairness to the defendant is the key to the jurisdictional inquiry,
then that belief is dispositive.
III. THE MODERN APPROACH TO PERSONAL JURISDICTION
The Supreme Court in Pennoyer missed an opportunity to refine the
definition of the personal jurisdiction requirement as the Court translated
it from a sovereign-focused doctrine to an individual right. The Supreme
Court has had the opportunity to remedy that failure, but has instead
embarked on a relatively open-ended inquiry that has developed a
common law of personal jurisdiction ultimately based on fairness.
Where the Pennoyer Court failed to address the need to translate
personal jurisdiction into an individual right, the modem Court has failed
to recognize that pre-existing rules of jurisdiction could serve as the basis
for the development of a modem rule. In part because it has not put the
two pieces together, the Court has reached the point where it is unable to
generate majority opinions on contentious issues of jurisdiction.
A. International Shoe to the Present Stalemate
The seams started to show in the Pennoyer doctrine as interstate
travel and commerce became more widespread, leading to the problems
that the Supreme Court attempted to address in International Shoe.'
60
Unfortunately, the Court did not do so by explicitly finishing the
translation of personal jurisdiction from a requirement rooted in state to
state relations to an individual right grounded in the Fourteenth
Amendment. Instead, the Court suggested that it faced a binary choice
159. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
160. Id. at 311.
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between jurisdiction based on mere physical power and jurisdiction
based on reasonableness and fairness, before choosing the latter course.
The Court held:
[D]ue process requires only that, in order to subject a defendant to a
judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the
forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the
maintenance of the suit does not offend "traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice. 161
Because the International Shoe Court essentially abandoned the
traditional guideposts of the jurisdiction inquiry, it provided only vague
guidance for lower courts to follow. The Court acknowledged that "the
criteria by which we mark the boundary line between those activities
which justify the subjection of a corporation to suit and those which do
not cannot be simply mechanical or quantitative." 62  The Court laid
down the rule that a state may not make a judgment binding against a
defendant with which the state has no contacts but otherwise left lower
courts to conduct a relatively open-ended evaluation of "the quality and
nature of the activity."'
63
It was left for future cases to explain what sort of contacts rendered
a person fair game for an assertion of jurisdiction. In McGee v.
International Life Insurance Co.,164 the Court provided some guidance,
explaining that "[i]t is sufficient for purposes of due process that the suit
was based on a contract which had substantial connection with that
[s]tate"'165 in the course of holding that providing life insurance to an
individual in California sufficed to allow California to exercise
jurisdiction over the defendant. The Court then found an exercise of
jurisdiction that it did not approve of in Hanson v. Denckla, 166 holding:
The unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship with a
nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of contact with
the forum [s]tate ... [I]t is essential in each case that there be some
161. Id. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
162. Id. at319.
163. Id.
164. McGee v. Int'l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
165. Id. at 223. The Court firther noted:
[T]here may be inconvenience to the insurer if it is held amenable to suit in
California where it had this contract but certainly nothing which amounts to a
denial of due process .... There is no contention that respondent did not have
adequate notice of the suit, or sufficient time to prepare its defenses and appear.
Id. at 224.
166. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
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act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege
of conducting activities within the forum [s]tate. 167
Read together, these cases seemed to be puzzling out the contours
of an individual right. An individual had the right to avoid being haled
into court unless that individual purposefully directed activity at the
forum. Though a very slight level of activity sufficed to support an
exercise of jurisdiction, activity that reached the forum due to the
unilateral acts of another was not enough.
The Court next addressed the issue in World-Wide Volkswagen, a
case that could have been drawn from the pages of a law school exam.
Plaintiffs purchased an automobile from a dealer in New York that they
attempted to drive to Arizona.168 They suffered severe injuries in a
traffic accident in Oklahoma, some of which they attributed to defects in
the automobile.169  Accordingly, plaintiffs attempted to bring suit in
Oklahoma against the dealer, the regional wholesaler (who sold cars in
New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut), and the two Volkswagen
entities that manufactured the cars in Germany and sold them throughout
the United States. 1
70
The Court did not reexamine the history of the jurisdiction
requirement or the incorporation of the requirement through the Due
Process Clause. Instead, it noted that "[t]he protection against
inconvenient litigation is typically described in terms of 'reasonableness'
or 'fairness"' 171 before insisting that "the reasonableness of asserting
jurisdiction over the defendant must be assessed in the context of our
federal system of government."'172 The Court emphasized what it felt
was the structural nature of the requirement:
Even if the defendant would suffer minimal or no inconvenience
from being forced to litigate before the tribunals of another [s]tate;
even if the forum [sitate has a strong interest in applying its law to
the controversy; even if the forum [s]tate is the most convenient
location for litigation, the Due Process Clause, acting as an
instrument of interstate federalism, may sometimes act to divest the
[s]tate of its power to render a valid judgment. 173
Standing alone, this conclusion is not dissimilar from other
individual rights. States may not infringe on freedom of speech, for
167. Id. at 253.
168. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 288 (1980).
169. Id. at 288.
170. Id. at 288-89.
171. Id. at292.
172. Id. at 293 (citations omitted).
173. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 294 (citations omitted).
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example, simply because it is convenient. However, World- Wide
Volkswagen lacks-as critics have pointed out 74--an explanation of
why and how exactly state sovereignty and the federal system became
elements of a test based on reasonableness and fairness.
The Court refocused its attention on the due process origins of the
jurisdictional requirement a few years later in a case presenting the issue
of whether a court could find personal jurisdiction as a discovery
sanction.175 Confronted with a case that did not require a determination
as to the fairness of attaching jurisdictional consequences to any
particular primary behavior, the Court responded with a cogent
discussion of the roots of personal jurisdiction, recognizing that "the
requirement of personal jurisdiction represents first of all an individual
right."'76  While the Court did not address the implications this fact
might have as to the substance of the personal jurisdiction requirement in
general-the facts of the case did not present any issues on that front-
the renewed focus on the Due Process Clause rather than free-floating
fairness was heartening.
Unfortunately the problems the Supreme Court confronted in
developing an adequate theoretical explanation for personal jurisdiction
began to prevent the Court from reaching majority opinions tarting with
Asahi177 The crux of the disagreement centered around how to treat the
so-called "stream of commerce:" when A sells a part to B, who
incorporates it into a larger product that is sold to C, who then sells the
product in California, should A be subject to personal jurisdiction in
California?178  All of the Justices agreed that this particular case
presented one of the rare examples where the "interests analysis"
demanded a finding of no jurisdiction: the California plaintiff had settled
his claims and dropped out of the suit, leaving only an issue of indemnity
between a Taiwanese corporation and a Japanese corporation.179 The
plurality opinion and Brennan concurrence, however, split on the proper
analysis of minimum contacts.
According to the plurality opinion written by Justice O'Connor, the
"substantial connection between the defendant and the forum [s]tate
necessary for a finding of minimum contacts must come about by an
action of the defendant purposefully directed toward the forum
174. See Redish, supra note 1, at 1112.
175. Ins. Co. of Ir. v. Compagnie Des Bauxites, 456 U.S. 694 (1982).
176. Id. at 702-03.
177. Asahi Metal Indus. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
178. In Asahi, the original product was a valve stem, which was used as part of a
motorcycle tire that ultimately failed and caused a traffic accident.
179. Asahi Metal, 480 U.S. at 116.
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[s]tate."'18  The "defendant's awareness that the stream of commerce
may or will sweep the product into the forum [s]tate does not convert the
mere act of placing the product into the stream into an act purposefully
directed toward the forum [s]tate."' 81 The defendant must do something
more to show that the activity is directed at the forum.
Brennan's concurrence would have made foreseeability the
touchstone of the inquiry. 182 He argued that when a participant in the
stream of commerce "is aware that the final product is being marketed in
the forum [s]tate, the possibility of a lawsuit there cannot come as a
surprise."'183  As a matter of fairness, he argued that burdening an
individual with the prospect of litigation in a state when that individual
has profited from economic interaction with that state is reasonable. 1
84
The split remained in the latest case presenting the stream of
commerce problem, J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro.185  A
British company, J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd., sold a recycling machine
used to cut metal to a company in New Jersey through its U.S.
distributor.186  Justice Kennedy's plurality opinion held that simply
targeting the United States as a whole was not enough; rather, to find
jurisdiction in New Jersey it was necessary to show purposeful targeting
of New Jersey. 1
87
In describing the jurisdictional requirement, Kennedy introduced
the new concept of submission to a state's authority as part of the
inquiry.188 Kennedy described both actual consent and presence in the
state at the time of service as examples of submission to state
authority.'89  Purposeful availment of the privilege of conducting
activities in a state constituted a "submi[ssion] to the judicial power of an
otherwise foreign sovereign to the extent that power is exercised in
connection with the defendant's activities touching on the [s]tate."' 90
Kennedy insisted that "jurisdiction is in the first instance a question
of authority rather than fairness" and described purposeful availment as a
180. Id. at 112.
181. Id. at 112.
182. Id. at 117 (Brennan, J., concurring).
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011).




190. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2788.
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method by which one may "submit to sovereign authority.'' 9 While his
opinion has drawn criticism, 192 1 believe it is a step in the right direction.
As an initial critique, the concept of "submission" is vulnerable to
the same problems that plague any attempt to ground jurisdiction in the
concept of "consent."'193 The defendant in most cases will neither have
made a conscious decision to submit to sovereign authority nor a
conscious decision to consent to the exercise of jurisdiction.
Accordingly a court is not seeking "consent" or "submission" but rather
is determining whether implying such a state of mind is fair. If it so
determines, the court will impose jurisdiction. Since the court is engaged
in an inquiry that bears no relation to the defendant's actual state of
mind, describing the doctrine as being based on "consent" or
"submission" is arguably pointless at best and misleading at worst.
However, the search for constructive submission is far better
attuned to the history and structure of the personal jurisdiction
requirement than is a search for constructive consent. Looking for
consent implies a search for some kind of quid pro quo or equivalent
exchange. As Justice Scalia has pointed out, the exchange involved in
the imposition of jurisdiction is often extremely one-sided. 194  An
insistence on restraining jurisdiction to situations where it represents a
fair exchange would require an extensive reworking of the doctrine.
Constructive submission, on the other hand, searches for actions by
the defendant that he might reasonably believe would provoke a state to
exercise power over his person. In times past, this expectation might be
based on the state's physical ability to project power. Today, this would
require an evaluation of whether his interaction with the state is
sufficiently extensive to make such an exercise of power legitimate.
Of course, this framing of the problem leaves open the question of
what sort of interactions are enough. This is where the Court should
draw on the history of the jurisdictional requirement from its inception
through the changes wrought by the Fourteenth Amendment in order to
191. Id. at 2787.
192. See, e.g., John T. Parry, Introduction: Due Process, Borders, and the Qualities
of Sovereignty-Some Thoughts on J. McIntyre Machinery v. Nicastro, 16 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REv. 827, 861-63 (2012) (criticizing the focus on "submission" as a key
component of jurisdiction).
193. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2799 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg argued:
Whatever the state of academic debate over the role of consent in modem
jurisdictional doctrines, the plurality's notion that consent is the animating
concept draws no support from controlling decisions of this Court. Quite the
contrary, the Court has explained, a forum can exercise jurisdiction when its
contacts with the controversy are sufficient; invocation of a fictitious consent,
the Court has repeatedly said, is unnecessary and unhelpful.
Id. (footnote omitted).
194. See Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 623 (1990) (Scalia, J.).
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guide its decisions, rather than relying on individual Justice's senses of
fair play. Unfortunately, in abandoning as irrelevant the history of the
jurisdictional requirement, the Court left itself with nothing to guide its
development of the jurisdictional test beyond principles of fairness. It is
not surprising that an open ended inquiry about fairness has led to widely
diverging opinions, nor that it has led to a situation where a majority of
Justices cannot agree as to what is fair.
B. Failure of the Untethered Approach
The Supreme Court has developed an elaborate "litany" of personal
jurisdiction related rules. 195 Many cases fall within the framework of the
Supreme Court's majority opinions on the topic and can be decided fairly
easily. However, when a difficult case arises that falls outside of that
framework, the Court is left with nothing to fall back on but its sense of
"fair play and substantial justice.'
196
The Court should instead focus on the development of the
individual right protected by the personal jurisdiction requirement that
has been stalled since Pennoyer v. Neff. While Justice Kennedy was
right that "[f]reeform notions of fundamental fairness"'197 are an
inadequate basis for a legal doctrine, his assertion that "jurisdiction is in
the first instance a question of authority rather than fairness''198 presents
a false choice. Personal jurisdiction, like other doctrines developed
under the Fourteenth Amendment, is first and foremost a question of
individual rights. 199
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF A REFINED INCORPORATION APPROACH TO
PERSONAL JURISDICTION
Up to this point this Article has shown how a refined incorporation
approach to personal jurisdiction can justify grounding the requirement
in the Constitution as an individual right and that such an approach is
largely consistent with the modem line of personal jurisdiction cases. In
this section, the Article will describe how the refined incorporation
approach suggests a positive direction for the future evolution of the
personal jurisdiction doctrine.
195. Stewart, supra note 82, at 5-6.
196. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
197. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2787.
198. Id. at 2789.
199. See supra Part II.C.4.
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A. The Purposeful Availment Debate
The most contentious issue currently occupying the Supreme
Court's attention with regard to personal jurisdiction is the question of
what minimum quantum of contact suffices to render a defendant
amenable to jurisdiction in the forum state.200 One side of the debate
argues that placing an item in the "stream of commerce" that ultimately
washes it into the forum, in which the item then causes an injury, should
be enough to sustain jurisdiction.0 1 The other argues that the defendant
must have also somehow purposefully targeted the forum state.20 2
Approaching the issue from an individual rights perspective helps to
clarify the context of the battle. In particular, courts should look to see:
(1) whether the right to be left alone extend to cover this situation; (2)
whether this behavior waives the right; and (3) whether the forum state
has an overwhelming interest that justifies setting aside the right.
The first question addresses the extent of the right to be left alone.
In particular, does the right extend to cover a state where the defendant's
product is sold to consumers even if the defendant did not make any
particular effort to target that state? It seems that it must. The only
states that a defendant has no protection against are her home state and
states where her presence is such that she is, practically speaking, at
home in the jurisdiction.2 3 All other states must show at least some
justification to assert jurisdiction over a defendant.
One such justification would be if the defendant's behavior is
sufficient to constitute constructive waiver of her rights. The particular
question of what sorts of commercial behavior constitute waiver requires
a determination of the necessary level of mens rea. The more restrictive
trend in Supreme Court opinions would require purposeful direction of
activity towards the forum state, while the less restrictive side of the split
would find knowing, or perhaps even reckless, direction of activity
towards the state to be sufficient.
If personal jurisdiction is grounded on the right to be left alone, it
seems reasonable to require deliberate action by the defendant in order to
set aside that right. After all, a constitutional right is at stake. It is bad
enough to toss the right over the side in the absence of an actual,
knowing waiver. In determining what activity deserves to be treated as if
knowing waiver has occurred, only deliberate targeting of the forum state
seems sufficient. Selling an item to somebody who does not live in the
200. Asahi Metal Indus. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 106 (1987); Nicastro, 131
S. Ct. at 2785 (2011).
201. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2794-95 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
202. Id. at 2788.
203. See supra Part II.B.
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forum state simply should not suffice absent the intent that she resell to
somebody in the forum state.
B. Replacing General and Specific Personal Jurisdiction
While the most active debate around personal jurisdiction focuses
on the proper treatment of an item placed in the stream of commerce, the
"purposeful availment" requirement is not the only scrutiny applied to
the actions of the defendant. There is also the matter of the connection
between the defendant's actions and the facts giving rise to the suit.
The level of connection is not explicitly part of the test for personal
jurisdiction. Instead, there are two different tests for personal
jurisdiction: actions that are not connected to the suit must satisfy the
test of general jurisdiction,2° while actions that are connected only need
to satisfy the test of specific jurisdiction.20 5 In effect, the existence of a
connection acts as a gatekeeper that allows one to utilize the easier to
satisfy specific jurisdiction test.
A plaintiff who attempts to satisfy the general jurisdiction inquiry is
required to show such an extensive connection between the defendant
and the forum state that it is fair to effectively treat the defendant as a
citizen of the forum. 206 The benefit of doing so is that the plaintiff may
then bring any suit at all against the defendant in that forum.20 7 On the
other hand, a plaintiff who can show a connection between the act and
the suit at most need only show that the act is purposely directed at the
state, but may only bring suits directly connected to the act.208
A question that naturally arises when presented with such a sharp
dichotomy is what happens when a situation seems to straddle the
borders between the tests. That is, what if there appears to be somewhat
of a connection between the suit and the act in the forum, but it is not
strong enough to warrant a finding of general jurisdiction? Doctrinally
the answer would seem to be an easy finding of no jurisdiction: there is
not enough of a connection for specific jurisdiction, and the contacts are
not strong enough for general jurisdiction. However, revisiting the
assumption that "connection" is a simple yes or no question will show
that there is space for what one might term "intermediate jurisdiction."
204. Helicopteros Nacionales v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984).
205. As commentators have noted, it is not always self-evident which contacts should
qualify as "connected." See Brilmayer, supra note 3, at 82.
206. Helicopteros Nacionales, 466 U.S. at 414-16.
207. Id. at 414.
208. J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2786 (2011).
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1. The Need for Intermediate Jurisdiction
Before addressing the issue of personal jurisdiction directly, it is
worthwhile to consider briefly the concept of connection. At first blush,
it appears to be a yes or no question: is the act connected with the suit?
However, the idea of connection between act and suit is somewhat
analogous to the idea of familial relations. The question "is person A
related to person B" appears initially to call for a simple yes or no in
response. It is easy enough to answer such a question for fathers and
sons, brother and sister, and even for cousins. The answer starts to get a
little trickier as the analysis moves out to more distant relations: second
cousins, third cousins, fourth cousins. Pushing the boundary further, we
may identify A and B as both being one of the 16 million people
descended from Genghis Khan. If the analysis is extended even farther
back in time, larger and larger portions of the human race will share at
least one common ancestor. So the inquiry of "are they related" contains
within it two questions: (1) how closely are they related; and (2) is the
relationship close enough to cross some indeterminate threshold to
qualify under the colloquial definition of "related." The issue of
connection to the suit similarly conceals an issue of magnitude behind an
apparently simple binary inquiry.
One example of an intermediate level of connection would be an
activity that is the same as the activity that gave rise to the suit, but not
directly connected to the suit itself. For example, suppose a car
manufacturer sells cars to all 50 states. A consumer purchases a car in
New York and drives it to Oklahoma, where it is involved in an accident
that allegedly causes harms due to a product defect. Should the
consumer be able to bring a suit in Oklahoma? The manufacturer sells
cars to Oklahoma and is being sued over a car that hurt somebody in
Oklahoma. However, as to the actual car involved in the accident, the
manufacturer only directed activity at New York.
If one were to adhere strictly to the terms of the tests laid out by the
Supreme Court, it would be difficult to justify the exercise of jurisdiction
by Oklahoma. As an initial matter, general jurisdiction is right out:
selling a product into a state falls well short of the sort of pervasive
contacts needed to justify a finding of general jurisdiction.0 9
Meanwhile, although selling cars directly into a state certainly constitutes
purposeful activity directed at the forum, specific jurisdiction is also
going to be a tough sell. The activity directed at the forum has nothing to
209. See, e.g., Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846,
2851 (2010). Most cases at the Supreme Court level contemplating the exercise of
general jurisdiction have found it inappropriate.
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do with the lawsuit at hand; whether the manufacturer sells cars into
Oklahoma has nothing to do with whether a particular car sold in New
York was defective.
There are several possibilities available if one were inclined to try to
find in favor of the plaintiff. One would be to argue roughly as follows:
sure, the modem litany of cases dictate that exercises of jurisdiction need
to comport with fair play and substantial justice, which means the
defendant must have minimum contacts such that the exercise of
jurisdiction be reasonable, which in turn means that the defendant must
have made some purposeful direction of activity to the forum state that
gives rise to the suit.210 But all of that should be interpreted in a manner
in keeping with the general principles enunciated in International Shoe.
And at the end of the day, what could be more in keeping with the
principles of fair play and substantial justice than to hale somebody into
court who sells cars into Oklahoma after one of her cars has a wreck in
Oklahoma? Quibbling over where the particular car in question was sold
is simply nitpicking, a lawyerly attempt to distract that court from the
true interests of justice.
That kind of reasoning may very well be how the Supreme Court
would have dealt with the situation in World Wide Volkswagen had
Volkswagen of America not conceded jurisdiction. However, such an
approach is problematic, as illustrated by the following: suppose the car
had crashed in Texas, but the plaintiff still wanted to bring suit in
Oklahoma. The modified situation removes much of the instinctive
appeal of the fair play argument, but it is difficult to find logical
justification for a change in result. After all, if you sell cars into
Oklahoma, how can a suit in Oklahoma over a defective car unfairly
surprise you? The facts are easily susceptible to continued manipulations
to render the fair play argument gradually less tenable: the particular
model involved in the crash might not be sold in Oklahoma, or the
vehicle involved in the crash might be a commercial truck while all of
the vehicles sold in Oklahoma are consumer vehicles, and so on. At
some point the fair play argument is no longer compelling.
Given the situation above, there are three choices: (1) leave the
determination up to each individual judge or justice's personal sense of
fair play; (2) simply refuse to exercise jurisdiction when the plaintiff
can't meet the requirements of specific jurisdiction, strictly construed; or
(3) attempt to devise a test which will refine the meaning of fair play and
allow individuals to predict which situations will subject them to suit in
foreign jurisdictions and which will not.
210. See Stewart, supra note 82, at 6.
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Assuming that the first two options are unappealing, all that remains
is to devise a rule to separate cases that merit the exercise of
"intermediate jurisdiction" from those that do not. Fortunately, the
Supreme Court has provided some guidance on the matter. The Court
has indicated that a very high level of activity supports the exercise of
general jurisdiction with no connection between the activity and the case
at hand. The Court has also held that a very strong connection between
the activity and the case at hand supports the exercise of specific
jurisdiction so long as the activity, no matter how trivial, is purposefully
directed at the forum. When viewing these two tests not as separate
categories of jurisdiction but rather as two poles with which to organize
our inquiry, the test for intermediate jurisdiction emerges: the exercise
of jurisdiction requires a combination of a connection to the case and
some level of activity directed at the forum state. Taking the
requirements for general jurisdiction as a starting point, as the connection
to the case strengthens, the level of activity required decreases. Starting
from the requirements for specific jurisdiction, as the level of activity
increases, the required level of connection to the case decreases. At
some point the two tests will meet in the middle of the spectrum on both
connection and activity level.
One positive result of adopting this test is that it actually reduces the
complexity of the jurisdictional inquiry. The current state of the law has
two conceptually different methods by which to establish jurisdiction.
Introducing the concept of jurisdiction at an intermediate level of
specificity lets courts reduce the inquiry to a single test, with the existing
categories recognized as special cases.
2. Justifying Intermediate Jurisdiction
An intermediate form of personal jurisdiction may be problematic
from a due process point of view. One possible line of reasoning for the
different treatment of related and unrelated contacts is rooted in the idea
that the purpose of due process jurisprudence is to protect against the
imposition of burdens on outsiders.21' Outsiders who have contact with a
forum can reasonably be haled into court when their contact is
substantively related to a case or controversy, while a state that attempts
to base jurisdiction on unrelated contacts appears to be engaging in
discrimination against outsiders.21 2 On the other hand, sufficiently
extensive unrelated contacts suggest "that the person or corporate entity




is enough of an 'insider' that he may safely be relegated to the [s]tate's
political processes.213
Intermediate jurisdiction is more compatible with the idea of
personal jurisdiction as an incorporated right. One consequence of the
conclusion that personal jurisdiction derives from a right to be left alone
is that the right should be set aside when, but only when, the person
possessing the right does something that merits overcoming its
protection. There is no space in such an inquiry for an artificial divide
between connected and unconnected behavior based on something like
which facts would be alleged in a well pleaded complaint. Rather, such
an inquiry must focus on whether the individual has done something
substantial enough and sufficiently connected to the cause of action to
merit the exercise of jurisdiction. The kind of balanced inquiry
suggested by treating personal jurisdiction as an individual right is the
same sort of inquiry discussed above as a logical result of acknowledging
the existence of an intermediate form of jurisdiction sitting between the
current general and specific jurisdiction doctrines.
C. Implications for Substantive Due Process in General
The incorporation of rights-particularly rights not written into the
Constitution-is often a contentious matter. Cases such as Roe v.
Wade2 14 and Lochner v. New York 15 are among the most controversial
decisions ever handed down by the Supreme Court and remain the
subject of intense scholarly discussion today.216 One interesting feature
of personal jurisdiction as an incorporated right is the surprising lack of
controversy surrounding its existence.
However although scholars might bemoan the existence of personal
jurisdiction as a constitutional doctrine, the Supreme Court has never
shown any sign that it might be swept away, nor has any lower court that
I am aware of ever questioned the constitutional foundations of personal
jurisdiction. Considering that personal jurisdiction is as vulnerable to the
critique that it is a right not written into the Constitution as are the rights
at issue in Lochner and Roe, it is interesting that it seems to be such a
fixed star in the constitutional sky.
One possible explanation is that personal jurisdiction is just not
particularly salient. While substantial political coalitions pressed for the
appeal of Lochner and Roe, there is no political constituency that is
213. Id. at 87.
214. Roev. Wade, 410U.S. 113(1973).
215. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
216. See generally, e.g., RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION:
THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY (rev. ed. 2014).
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passionately in favor of extending the possible reach of state long-arm
statutes. This fact is hard to deny.
Yet it might also be significant that the requirement of personal
jurisdiction enjoyed a long pedigree before its incorporation as a personal
right. While personal jurisdiction might not have been written into the
Bill of Rights, it was a doctrine that disparate state courts and the
Supreme Court essentially recited word for word in a plethora of cases in
the 80 years before the Pennoyer decision. It may be that the Court
stands on firmer ground when it incorporates such a well-established
right than when it attempts to incorporate the more speculative rights at
issue in other substantive due process cases.
CONCLUSION
The requirement of personal jurisdiction is deeply rooted in
American history. The Supreme Court initiated a revolution in the
treatment of personal jurisdiction by shifting its justification from
mediating conflicts between sovereigns to protecting individual rights.
Unfortunately, the Court failed to follow up on the implications of this
shift, instead embedding a relatively rigid rule into the Constitution.
When it came time to update the rule, the Court, rather than inquiring
into the nature of the individual right it was protecting, endorsed a
relatively free form pursuit of fairness and substantial justice.
This Article has shown how a refined incorporation approach to
personal jurisdiction helps to identify the individual right that the
doctrine ought to protect. By conducting such a directed inquiry, courts
can ground the requirement of personal jurisdiction on something other
than fairness and receive direction on how to approach problems that
exist outside of the well-defined rules already laid down by the Supreme
Court.
If the Supreme Court were to adopt the refined incorporation view
of personal jurisdiction, it would finally provide a clear answer to the
question of how the Due Process Clause mandates a requirement of
personal jurisdiction. Further, the additional guidance offered by such an
approach may allow the Court to reach a consensus on difficult questions
of personal jurisdiction in a manner that is not happening under the
current pursuit of fairness and substantial justice.
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